Minds: Are Mirror Neuron Systems the DNA of Psychology or
a Red Herring?
the following is minimally edited lectures notes for a talk
I gave to the chaos and complexity seminar group in the in
the Physics Dept. Univ. Wisc. Madison, on 10/24/06)
have been puttering with a talk/web lecture that would logically
follow the "I Illusion" and "The Beast Within."
Illusion" talk was mainly on sensing and acting, how our brains
massage these processes mainly outside our awareness, so that
we are in fact 'late to consciousness' with our subjective
experience being an after the fact report of what has already
happened. You can measure this happening with machines, you
can have some introspective access to it.
Beast Within," described regulatory and emotional layers of
our experience that we share with other mammals, and that operate
alongside, and sometimes more rapidly than, our more distinctive
human cognitions. You can measure this with machines, you
can have some introspective access to it.
thought about this talk/web lecture, "Mirroring Minds" was
to focus on our social brain, on brain processes that link
us to other humans and the larger social contexts that are
a basis of our survival. What is the neuronal basis of "intersubjectivity?"
thought the core of this might be describing recently discovered
mirror neuron systems and their implications. There is a lot
of speculation based on a few simple experiments that don't
take a lot of time time to cover.
am not getting a satisfying bottom line on 'social brain' of
the sort that came together in the earlier talks. Robin Chapman,
an organizer of the weekly Chaos and Complexity seminar at
the University of Wisconin said "Hey, not to worry just lead
an open discussion."
lines of evidence have suggested we should look for a neuronal
basis of intersubjectivity. We know that mammals have highly
developed evolved neuronal and hormonal substrates of affiliative
behavior, and a new field of "affiliative neuroscience" has
been defined in just the past ten years. Oxytocin and vasopression
regulate infant parent interaction in prairie voles and in
humans. Oxytocin delivered with a nasal inhaler makes humans
infants discriminate happy, sad, and surprised faces within
a few hours after birth and make primitive imitations of the
expressions they see, they are equating their own unseen behaviors
with gestures they see others perform.
is imitation, not reflexes or ethological releasing mechanisms
which are highly specific to limited stimuli. It is flexible,
takes time, the range of behaviors displayed by infants would
require one to postulate distinct releasing mechanisms for
each kind of behavior: tongue protrusion, mouth openings, lip
protrusion, head movement, finger movement, as well as smile,
we come equipped with innate seeing, moving, and sensing systems
that include a self/other model. We're born into a world of
other humans with a computational model that transforms visual
information into motor commands - a phenomenal connection between
self and others exists from birth... 'experientially' (whatever
that means for a neonate), and not just objectively, we are
born into a world of others.
makes adaptive sense, the function of bonding to caretaker.
Touch and stroking by a caretaker is required to support and
stimulate growth. In its absence wasting and death can occur
both in us and in other mammals. Studies using mice have documented
how stroking and licking promote brain growth and development.
Its absence can lead to permanent activation of stress hormone
pathways and stunted growth of parts of the brain.
bodies and brains generate selves, or rather, the evolving
idea of the self generates us the culture's contemporary
model of the self generates us as we mirror the actions, emotions,
intentions of caretakers and peers - self that is generated
by mimicry or mirroring initially and then gains a more self
referential internal loop as development continues. - the selves
we experience today, with its particular sense of introspective
agency and individuality, would have been completely alien
to most people living a thousand years ago.
main recent driving force in hominid evolution has been competition
between different human groups, the shifting natures of inter-
and intra-group cooperation and competition. We follow countless
intricate social rules, as in traffic, or kinesic communication.
Both within our own groups and with respect to other groups. We
need to be mind reading all the time, be empathetic to the
feelings of others.
really haven't know much about the neuronal basis of empathy, of
knowing what someone else is feeling or doing, or of attributing
beliefs and motivations to others. .... can we measure something,
like, physical, ...like mechanisms?
is why there is been so much excitement in recent years over
the discovery of a kind of neuron, and neuronal systems: mirror
neurons. The prominent neuroscientist Ramachandran, for example, has
invoked them as doing for Psychology what DNA did for Biology. There
is a bit of a backlash against the concept being totally oversold.
want to give you a brief description of them, as they've been
found to mirror both actions and emotions,
now have come up with models that make motor systems central
to explaining volition, agency, language, and consciousness. The
idea is that the logic of the motor/ sensory system might be
at the core of many operation we have usually considered to
be more dis-embodied pure cognition.
NEURONS - ACTION
neuron systems were first discovered by Rizzolatti, Gallese
et al. in studies of premotor cortex of macaques (the red and
yellow areas in the figure) , microelectrode recordings of
how movements are planned, organized, executed.
respond both to the movements that a monkey makes and when
the monkey observes another monkey making the same movements.
Hence the name. There is evidence, mostly brain imaging data
more indirect than in monkeys, that humans have a mirror neuron
system too. In us, it's thought to be located around the right
superior temporal sulcus (red and yellow areas in figure B).
are two main ideas on how action understanding occurs. The
first is a 'visual model', saying that action understanding
is based on a visual analysis of the different elements that
form an action, and that no motor involvement is required.
second is a 'direct-matching hypothesis', saying we understand
actions when we map the visual representation of the observed
action onto our motor representation of the same action. An
action is understood when its observation causes the motor
system of the observer to 'resonate'.
for the second is what is accumulating. The Italians had
electrodes implanted in the pre-motor cortex of a macaque monkey
to measure nerve cell activity during the planning and execution
of a movement: picking up a peanut. During a lull in the
experiments, one of the experimenters picked up a peanut,
just as the monkey would.
monkey was doing nothing but watching, but the pre-motor cortical
cells that had been active when the monkey was picking up the
peanut, now became active when the same activity was observed
in someone else.
mirror neurons do not respond to the sight of a hand mimicking
an action in the absence of the target. Similarly, they do
not respond to the observation of an object alone, even when
it is of interest to the monkey.
Rizzolatti et al., Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2, 661-670 (2001)
Strong activation is present in F5 during observation of the
experimenter's grasping movements, and while the same action
is performed by the monkey. B Note the absence of a neural
response when the observed action is performed with a tool.
Rasters and histograms show activity before and after the point
at which the experimenter touched the food
turns out that there is another regions in the parietal (usually
thought of as mainly sensory) lobe that contains cells that
also discharge during action observations and execution.
SYSTEMS CAN INFER HIDDEN GOALS:
al. studied the responses of F5 mirror neurons in two conditions. In
the first one, the monkey could see the whole action made by
the experimenter (full-vision condition). In the second, the
monkey could see only the beginning of the same action; the
crucial part - the hand/object interaction - was hidden from
view (hidden condition), although the monkey was shown that
an object or some food had previously been located behind the
screen. So, the meaning of the experimenter's action could
be inferred from the monkey's knowledge of the situation and
the view of the hand disappearing behind the screen.
results showed that more than half of the recorded mirror neurons
also discharged in the hidden condition. This indicates that,
despite the fact that the monkey did not see the action, it
knew its meaning; its neurons signalled 'the experimenter is
grasping' or 'the experimenter is holding' . This argues
against the need for a visual description of action for action
understanding, and therefore oppose the visual hypothesis.
for mirror systems in humans has been obtained from MEG (magnetoencephalogray),
TMS (trans cranial magentic stimulation), and MRI (magnetic
the homunculus.... note where mouth, hands, feet are represented
in the brain, moving from lateral to dorsal.
activation in frontal and parietal areas during the observation
of mouth, hand and foot actions. Showing both sides of brain. Motor
areas, again, are active during observation of the actions
they can generate.
b | Activation foci during the observation of non-object-related
(chewing; a) and object-related (biting an apple; b) mouth
actions. In both cases, activations were present in Brodmann
areas (BA) 6 and 44 in both hemispheres, and in BA 45 in
the right hemisphere.
the observation of object-related mouth action, two additional
activation foci were found in the parietal lobe.
c,d | Activation foci during the observation of hand actions
that were non-object related (mimicking grasping an object;
c) and object related (actually grasping an object; d). This
activation was dorsal to that found during the observation
of mouth actions.
additional object related activation foci were present in the
| Activation foci during the observation of foot actions that
were non-object related (mimicking kicking an object; e) and
object related (actually kicking an object; f). During the
observation of object-related actions, there was an additional
activation of the posterior parietal lobe (including area PE)
that partially overlapped with activations seen during the
observation of mouth and hand actions.
and parietal activation foci are presented in colour. Other
activations (mostly occipital) are shown in grey.
could give you more examples of mirroring in motor systems,
but I want to move to give just a few examples of how brain
areas involved in emotion also show mirroring behavior.
- MIRRORING EMOTIONS
watching James Bond, Sean Connery in Dr. NO
you get the creeps watching the spider crawl up James Bond's
arm, it may because the scene fires up the same neurons that
would be active were the spider making its way up your arm.
we have papers on seeing and feeling touch, also seeing and
figure below from Keysers et al Neuron,
42:335-346, 2004) shows the overlap
between Areas Activated by Touch and Areas Activated by the
Vision-of-Touch(A) Two coronal sections illustrate the extent
of the overlap between visual and somatosensory activations.
Areas activated only by the touch of the right or left leg
are shown in red , areas activated only by the vision-of-touch
are shown in blue; areas activated by both the touch and
the vision-of-touch conditions are shown in white.
that the overlap is lateralized to the left hemisphere.
appears to be part of a circuitry that is shared between the
first and third person experience.
the context of the existing results on actions and emotions,
one might speculate that the brain is parsimonious: it uses
the same mechanism of shared circuitry for actions, emotions,
et al (Neuron, 40:655-664 (2003) performed an fMRI study in
which participants inhaled odorants producing a strong feeling
of disgust. The same participants observed video clips showing
the emotional facial expression of disgust. Observing such
faces and feeling disgust activated the same sites in the anterior
insula and to a lesser extent in the anterior cingulate cortex.
following illustration shows the overlap (white) between
the brain activation during the observation (blue) and the
feeling (red) of disgust. The olfactory and visual analysis
were performed separately as random-effect analysis. The
results are superimposed on parasagittal slices of a standard
there is work on empathy for pain (Singer et al., Science
303: 1157-1162 (2004))
assessed brain activity while volunteers experienced a painful
stimulus (electrical shock delivered to right hand) and compared
it to that elicited when they observed a signal indicating
that their loved one-present in the same room-was receiving
a similar pain stimulus.
in green represent significant activation (P < 0.001) for
the contrast painno pain in the "self" condition and areas
in red for the contrast painno pain in the "other" condition.
The results are superimposed on a mean structural scan of the
16 subjects. Activations are shown on sagittal (A and B) and
axial (C and D) slices.
anterior insula (AI), rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
brainstem, and cerebellum were activated when subjects received
pain and also by a signal that a loved one experienced pain.
AI and ACC activation correlated with individual empathy scores.
a neural response in AI and rostral ACC, activated in common
for "self" and "other" conditions, suggests that the neural
substrate for empathic experience does not involve the entire "pain
matrix." They conclude that only that part of the pain network
associated with its affective qualities, but not its sensory
qualities, mediates empathy.
where are we.... we've seen some examples of mirroring, so
what? simple mimicking is kind of boring, what about
the intentions behind the movements of others we are mirroring.?
following graphic, taken from Rizzolatti et al.'s article in
the Nov. 2006 Scientific American, shows that firing of neurons
in the inferior parietal lobe of the macaque monkey can discriminate
intention, noting the difference between placing a food object
in the mouth or in a bowl.
Iacoboni et al. (PloS Biology, 3:1-7 (2005)) used functional
magnetic resonance imaging in humans to investigate "Grasping
the Intentions of Others with One's Own Mirror Neuron System"
subjects watched three kinds of stimuli: grasping hand actions
without a context, context only (scenes containing objects),
and grasping hand actions performed in two different contexts.
images are organized in three columns and two rows. Each column
corresponds to one of the experimental conditions. From left
to right: Context, Action, and Intention.
the Context condition there were two types of clips, a "before
tea" context (upper row) and an "after tea" context (lower
row). In the Action condition two types of grips were displayed
an equal number of times, a whole-hand prehension (upper row)
and a precision grip (lower row).
the Intention condition there were two types of contexts surrounding
a grasping action. The "before tea" context suggested the intention
of drinking (upper row), and the "after tea" context suggested
the intention of cleaning (lower row).
prehension (displayed in the upper row of the Intention column)
and precision grip (displayed in the lower row of the Intention
column) were presented an equal number of times in the "drinking" Intention
clip and the "cleaning" Intention clip.
Intention condition contained information that allowed the
understanding of intention, whereas the Action and Context
conditions did not (i.e., the Action condition was ambiguous,
and the Context condition did not contain any action).
expected, given the complexity of the stimuli, large increases
in neural activity were observed in occipital, posterior temporal,
parietal, and frontal areas (especially robust in the premotor
of the Action and Intention conditions. Notably, the observation
of the Intention and of the Action clips compared to rest yielded
significant signal increase in the parieto-frontal cortical
circuit for grasping. This circuit is known to be active during
the observation, imitation, and execution of finger movements
(''mirror neuron system'')
embedded in contexts, compared with the other two conditions,
yielded a significant signal increase in the posterior part
of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent sector of the
ventral premotor cortex where hand actions are represented.
see the differences you performs subtractions shown in this
subtractions high light differences in posterior part of the
inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent sector of the ventral
premotor cortex where hand actions are represented.
row.....The Intention condition yielded significant signal
to the Action condition-in visual
and in the right inferior frontal cortex, in the dorsal
of the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus
row ... in the Intention condition minus the Context
increase was also found in the same right inferior frontal
cortex previously seen activated in the comparison of the Intention
condition versus Action condition.
the differential activation in inferior frontal cortex observed
in the Intention condition versus Action condition, cannot
be simply due to the presence of objects in the Intention clips,
given that the Context clips also contain objects.
premotor mirror neuron areas-areas active during the execution
and the observation of an action-previously thought to be involved
only in action recognition are actually also involved in understanding
the intentions of others.
ascribe an intention is to infer a forthcoming new goal, and
this is an operation that the motor system does automatically.
conventional view on intention understanding is that the description
of an action and the interpretation of the reason why that
action is executed rely on largely different mechanisms.
works shows that the intentions behind the actions of others
can be recognized by the motor system using a mirror mechanism.
that coding the intention associated with the actions of others
is based on the activation of a neuronal chain formed by mirror
neurons coding the observed motor act and by "logically related" mirror
neurons coding the motor acts that are most likely to follow
the observed one, in a given context. To ascribe an intention
is to infer a forthcoming new goal, and this is an operation
that the motor system does automatically.
SYSTEMS AND SELF AND OTHER
want to mention a clever experiment: distinction of self and
other in mirroring motor neurons.
fact that the brain might represent others' actions like one's
own raise the issue of how we distinguish self from other. What
keeps us from constantly miming the actions of others? (This
happens in echolalia, the involuntary repetition of words being
heard that occurs in many persons with autism. ecopraxia, the
involuntary mimicking of movements)
et al (Current Biology 16:1830-1834 (2006)) have done a very
clever experiment to examine this by manipulating the sense
of body ownership (using the "rubber-hand illusion") to compare
effects of observing actions that either were or were not illusorily
attributed to the subject's own body.
me give you their description of the experiment: When subjects
watch a rubber hand being stroked while they feel synchronous
stroking of their own unseen hand, they feel that the rubber
hand becomes part of their body. Identical asynchronous stroking
has no effect.
the sense of owning the rubber hand requires congruence of
visual and tactile stimulation.
neural counterparts of this sense of ownership have been identified
in premotor and sensorimotor cortices.
rubber-hand illusion therefore allows balanced comparison between
the self and the other because a single stimulus is either
linked to the self or not depending on the pattern of previous
used a real human hand instead of the conventional rubber hand
because several studies show stronger mirroring effects for
viewing a live action than for viewing artificial equivalents.
show that observing another's actions facilitated the motor
system, like in the examples we've seen...... whereas observing
identical actions, which were illusorily attributed to the
subject's own body, showed the opposite pattern.
motor facilitation strongly depends on the agent to whom the
observed action is attributed.
result contradicts the idea of close equivalence between one's
own actions and actions of others and suggests that social
differentiation, not equivalence, is characteristic of the
human action system....
quote: "This suggests that the neural mechanisms underlying
action observation are intrinsically social. These mechanisms
map the actions of others to corresponding actions on one's
own body but do not simply represent the other agent as a derivative
of, or even an equal to, the self." In contrast, there appear
to be an agent-specific representation in the primary motor
look how much is going on in what we previously thought to
be simple old motor cortex that just plans and executes actions, its
doing intentionality, self vs. others, etc.
aren't distinct modular or phrenological type intentionality,
self vs. other brain areas, these functions get carried out
hear the relevant sites of sensing and acting, just as memories
are distributed over the cortex among areas relevant to their
context, just as vision isn't just he visual cortex but happens
in the 80+ percent of cortical neurons whose firing can be
influenced by visual input.
SYSTEMS AND AUTISM
clearly have in mirror
systems a potential neural mechanism for empathy, understanding others
by mirroring their brain activity.
idea is bolstered by evidence of abnormalities in the mirror
systems of people with autism and other disorders that impair
the ability to empathize with and understand the behavior
of others. There
seems to be mirror neuron dysfunction in children with autism
spectrum disorders, or ASD
Dapretto et al. (Nature Neuroscience, 9:28-31 (2006) looked
at mirror neuron abnormalities in autism by studying high-functioning
children with autism and matched controls. Both underwent fMRI
while imitating and observing emotional expressions. Although
both groups performed the tasks equally well, children with
autism showed no mirror neuron activity in the inferior frontal
gyrus (pars opercularis). Notably, activity in this area was
inversely related to symptom severity in the social domain,
suggesting that a dysfunctional 'mirror neuron system' may
underlie the social deficits observed in autism.
activity during IMITATION of emotional expressions. (a,b) Activity
in bilateral pars opercularis (stronger in the right) of the
inferior frontal gyrus is seen in the typically developing
group (a) but not in the ASD group (b). A between-group comparison
(c) revealed that this difference was significant (t > 1.83,
P < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster
level). RH, right hemisphere; LH, left hemisphere.
neuron system activity during OBSERVATION of emotional expressions.
The right pars opercularis showed significantly greater activity
in typically developing children than in children with ASD
(t > 1.83, P < 0.05, small volume corrected).
Dapretto et al paper references a strikingly complementary
study, Hadjikhani et al. (Neuroimage 22:1141-1150 (2004))
who have recently reported that adults with ASD displayed significantly
reduced cortical thickness in the main mirror neuron areas,
namely the bilateral pars opercularis of the inferior frontal
gyrus (also in the inferior parietal lobule and superior temporal
sulcus). These areas are the same that failed to activate when
children with ASD imitated facial expressions . Again in agreement
with functional data, cortical thinning in these areas was
correlated with severity of communication and social symptoms.
so far we have been dealing with context and behavior correlates
with brain activity..... I want to mention some interpretions
and speculations about where this is taking us.
has written a number of review papers making summary points...
wants to describe The mirror neuron matching systems and the
other non-motor mirroring neural clusters as embodied simulation. 'as
if' we would be doing a similar action or experiencing a similar
emotion or sensation.
cognition, then, is not only explicitly reasoning about the
contents of someone else's mind. Embodied simulation, is a
feeling, experiential insight of other minds. The share-ability
of the content of the intentional relations of others, is what "being
empathic" is about there is a shared neural state realized
in two different bodies that obey to the same anatomical functional
of course doesn't account for all of our social cognitive skills.
The same actions performed by others in different contexts
can lead the observer to different interpretations, that was
the drinking tea versus cleaning example we just saw. So,
social stimuli are also understood on the basis of the explicit
cognitive elaboration of their contextual aspects and of previous
simulation and cognitive elaboration are not mutually exclusive.
The idea is that embodied simulation scaffolds the propositional,
more cognitively sophisticated mind reading abilities. When
embodied simulation is not present or malfunctioning, as perhaps
in autism, cognitive elaboration can provides a more pale,
detached account of the social experiences of others.
will be an ongoing project to determine how much of social
cognition, language included, can be explained by embodied
simulation and its neural underpinnings.
area of speculation is that the mirror neuron process is an
important part of the evolution, development and execution
of our language abilities
language areas--Broca's and Wernicke's (yellow)--overlap
(orange) with areas critical for imitation (red)
there is the idea that mirror neurons could facilitate the
imitation of skilled movements like the hand and mouth movements
used for communication. Learning by imitation is a key feature
of language acquisition in infants and is widely considered
a prerequisite for language evolution.
turns out that listening to speech cues up activity in regions
of the frontal cortex that are active during speech production.
fits well with the old "motor theory of speech perception," ...when
children imitate their first words, they seem to be guided
by the "gestural" features of the sound--that is, by the actions
of the mouth rather than by a sound's acoustic features. Apparently
there is a well-known trick to demonstrate this is known as
the McGurk effect: If you watch someone pronounce the syllable "ga" while
listening to a recording of someone saying "ba," you will likely
hear "da," a sound anatomically between the other two.
idea is that we perceive speech by referring the sounds we
hear to our own production mechanism. .. because of an intuitive
sense of how our body parts correspond with those of others.
Like a small child knows how to raise its hand in response
to a parental wave. There's obviously a direct representation
of your body in its body.
are further speculations on implication of mirror systems for
basic Ontology and also higher cognitition. Gallese collaborates
with Metzinger on a paper titled: Motor Ontology:The representational
reality of goals, actions and selves (see Metzinger's website
for download, http://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/metzinger/publikationen/). Metzinger,
for my money, has written, in his book "Being No One" the most
coherent account to date integrating philosophical and neuroscientific
of what a human self actually is.
is condensation and abstracting of their article, which contains
a bit of philosophy-speak:
generating a coherent internal world-model, the brain decomposes
target space in a certain way. In doing so, it defines an "ontology":
To have an ontology is to interpret a world. It decomposes
target space in a way that exhibits certain invariances, which
in turn are functionally significant. The motor system constructs
goals, actions, and intending selves as basic constituents
of the world it interprets. Empirical evidence now clearly
shows how the brain actually codes movements and action goals
in terms of multimodal representations of organism-object-relations.
Under a representationalist analysis, this process can be interpreted
as an internal representation of the intentionality-relation
makes humans special is the fact that their functional ontology
is much richer in socially
representations and that their model of reality is not only
richer and much more flexible, but that they can actively expand their
own functional ontology by mentally ascribing distal goals
idea, in summary, is that a complex form of representational
content, once it is in place, can later function as the building
block for social cognition and a for more complex, consciously
experienced representation of the first-person perspective
as well. The motor system would then play a decisive role in
understanding how the functional ontology of the human brain
could be gradually extended into the subjective and social
pairs off with Lakoff to head into conceptual knowledge in
a paper titled: The Brain's Concepts: The Role of the Sensory_Motor
System in Conceptual Knowledge. (Download from http://www.unipr.it/arpa/mirror/english/staff/gallese.htm )
propose that the sensory-motor system has the right kind of
structure to characterize both sensory-motor and more abstract
concepts. ....that brain structures in the sensory-motor regions
are exploited to characterize the so-called "abstract" concepts
that constitute the meanings of grammatical constructions and
general inference patterns.
to wrap up: As I've said, I've got no bottom line beyond
repeating how we have to add some layers to Mr. Descartes model.....
what we are calling embodied cognition that mirrors our social
developmental context we have Sumus ergo Cogitamus .... the
social wiring of our brains grows and develops from mirroring
processes of the sort we have been talking about. While some
mirroring systems are in place at birth, most of what we are
seeing in the experiments listed above is mirroring that results
from extended observation and learning during development.
activity of a mirroring system within monkeys or ourselves
need not be accompanied by awareness of its presence. These
mirroring neuron systems are presumably the basis of the mirroring
of non-goal directed behaviors in schools of fish, flocks of
birds, or human yawning or laughing spreading through a group
without participants knowing it what it is `about'.
to control this mirror system, decouple it from the actual
executive motor structure is a precondition for achieving voluntary
control. I've mentioned the human psychiatric disorders such
as echopraxia in which subjects involuntarily mimic others.
we need to distinguish, in terms of both objective description
and our own subjective introspection, pre-reflective embodied
simulation (monkeys have it) with cognition enhanced contextual
mirroring. To note and distinguish what is automatic (facial
and body language mimicking) from reflective, cognitive and
relatively more dis-embodied.
got it right on this distinctively human fraction of our repetoire. "I
think therefore I am" is correct to the extent the thoughts
are a cognitive invention beyond the reflexive mirroring
are dealing with a gradient, we have homeostatic, emotional
and cognitive layers. The mirroring system at the emotional
(and motion) level is the platform on which more cognitive
enhancements are constructed.
old homily "You are what you spend your time doing" might also
be put as "You are what you spend your time mirroring or imagining." This
possibly being how George Bush manages to live in such a perfect